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MEGA INITIATIVE — MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN / MAKE EARTH GREAT AGAIN — IS AN INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE DEDICATED TO EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC SOVEREIGNTY, THE DEFENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS.

CLARIFICATION

This initiative is independent and non-partisan.
It has no connection with political movements that have used the acronym “MEGA” in nationalist or populist contexts.
On the contrary, the project is grounded in a European, democratic perspective committed to the respect of international law.

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"I dream that one day, in the face of the return of retreat,
of brute force and privatized truths,
Europe, Germany, France and the United Kingdom
will rise together to say :democracy is not a weakness,
truth is not negotiable,
and the rule of law deserves to be defended."

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MEGA Initiative — Founding Declaration · Version 1.0 · January 2026

Preamble to the MEGA Declaration

I dream that one day, in a world worn down by fear and confusion,
three leaders rise together,
and speak not to flatter, not to promise the impossible,
but to take responsibility.

I dream that one day, at the rostrum of the United Nations,
we stop confusing prudence with immobility, neutrality with abdication, peace with powerlessness.

I dream of a speech that clearly states that freedom is not the absence of rules,
that democracy does not survive without truth,
and that law, without capacity, becomes a prayer without effect.

I dream that one day, Europe stops defining itself by what it fears,
and begins once again to define itself by what it dares to protect.I dream of a speech that looks at the world as it is,
without naïveté, without cynicism, and that affirms that force can be contained,
provided it is framed, assumed, and subject to the rule of law.

I dream of a speech that states that innovation is not the privatization of the world,
that technology is not sovereignty,
and that democracy is not rented by subscription.I dream of a speech that reminds us that without shared facts,
there is no longer any majority — only tribes,
that without method, truth dissolves into narratives,
and that without truth, no free society endures for long.

I dream of a speech that finally accepts to pay the price of credibility:
to renounce ambiguities, paralyzing privileges,
and the comforts inherited from a world that no longer exists.I dream of a speech that states that
protecting peace sometimes requires sanctuarizing,
that deciding is not oppressing,
and that history does not forgive powerlessness.I dream that one day, this speech will be delivered.In the meantime, it is written.

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MEGA DECLARATION — UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Joint Alternating Address – France / Germany / United Kingdom

I — Foundations: responsibility, law, legitimacy

[FR] — Opening: the debt to the future

Mr President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Before speaking of power, institutions, or security, I want to speak of something older than our treaties : responsibility.Antoine de Saint-Exupéry wrote:
“We do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children.”This is not a formula. It is a mandate.Saint-Exupéry died on a wartime mission, off the coast of Marseille, in the cockpit of an American P-38.
This detail is not trivial: it speaks to a profound truth. Our history is made of solidarities, shared sacrifices, and loyalties.We are not here to deny this history. We are here to prevent it from becoming powerless nostalgia.If we speak today in the first person, it is not to personalize this moment.
It is to assume responsibility.
Because a founding act cannot be delegated.

[DE] — Law is not a luxury: it is peace

This forum exists for a simple idea: that law must contain force.
My country knows the cost of the collapse of rules, when law becomes decorative and power believes itself legitimate on its own.
We know that a society can appear stable, while being dangerously vulnerable.
I therefore say this with gravity:
International law is not a moral add-on.
It is the practical condition of peace.

[UK] — Powerlessness destroys legitimacy

Crises are not new.
What is new is the speed at which they turn into chaos when institutions become unable to act.
When an organization can no longer decide, it is not only bypassed: it is unlearned.
And when the world unlearns the rule, it relearns force.

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II — The world as it is: threats and dependencies

[FR] — Hybrid threats: sovereignty has become systemic

Threats are no longer only military.They are economic, technological, informational.
They move through payments, cables, satellites, logistical flows, narratives.A state can now be defeated without capitulating:
if its infrastructures are paralyzed,
if its flows are cut,
if its society is fractured.Sovereignty is no longer sectoral. It is systemic.

[DE] — German lucidity: industry alone no longer protects

We long believed that industrial power was sufficient to guarantee stability.We have learned — sometimes too late — that an industry without sovereignty becomes dependence,
and that dependence can become a lever of external domination.That is why we state this clearly:
industry must serve a political project, or it ceases to protect.

[UK] — Our DNA is the sea and trade, not withdrawal

Let us be clear: what we are proposing is not withdrawal.The United Kingdom is a maritime and trading power.
Our security depends on sea lanes, ports, straits, cables, and the fluidity of trade.We have no vocation to close the world.
We have a vocation to prevent it from being closed through coercion.

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III — MEGA: a political architecture for stability

[FR] — MEGA: the founding act

Today, we announce a political act: MEGA.MEGA is not a slogan.
MEGA is an architecture.Make Europe Great Again.
Make Earth Great Again.A capable Europe for a stable world.

[DE] — Make Earth Great Again: without enforcement, there is no rule

Make Earth Great Again means refusing a return to a world in which aggression becomes profitable.And I say this with the simplicity of law:
without enforcement, there is no legal rule.
There is only an empty text.Rules exist only if they carry a price.
This is not vengeance.
It is the condition of stability.

UK] — UN: the veto cannot be a license for war

The right of veto was designed as a mechanism of balance. It too often becomes a mechanism of paralysis.And I say this as the head of government of a country that holds this right:
no institutional privilege is sacred if it prevents the protection of peoples.We therefore propose a clear rule:
the veto cannot block international action when it concerns:

When the Council is paralyzed, legitimacy must return to the General Assembly.
And I add this: what we expect from the United Nations, we impose upon ourselves.

[DE] — EU: democracy is not immobility

This coherence binds us.Permanent unanimity, on vital matters, is not a superior form of democracy.
It can become a right of blockage that endangers the majority.
Deciding is not oppressing.
Deciding is assuming responsibility.

[FR] — A Europe that sanctuarizes does not escalate: it prevents

Make Europe Great Again does not mean escalation.
It means prevention.Peace is not maintained by incantation.
It is maintained because aggression is deterred.And yes: sanctuarizing our territory is a condition of freedom.

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IV —Democracy, Truth, Freedom: The Foundation

[FR] — MEGA Is Also Social: Returning to Original Liberalism

MEGA is not only a strategic architecture.
It is a political project — and therefore a social one.Liberalism was born as a doctrine of freedom and dignity.
Tocqueville understood this: a democracy does not endure solely through its laws,
but through the vitality of its social bond,
through trust among citizens,
through the ability of the greatest number to project themselves into the future.
Its drift into ultra-liberalism has concentrated wealth, weakened the middle classes, and fed fear.
Yet a democracy gripped by anxiety becomes vulnerable.
And a vulnerable democracy becomes manipulable.
MEGA corrects this drift:
the sovereignty we are building must generate growth,
and that growth must be shared,
otherwise there can be neither stability nor lasting freedom.

[DE] — German Industry in the Service of the Common Good: Without Appropriation

I want to be explicit.
German industrial power will be placed at the service of MEGA without ambiguity, and without any intent of national appropriation.
We are putting concrete mechanisms on the table:

Our industry becomes an instrument of European sovereignty — because without sovereignty, industry reverts to dependence.

[UK] — United Kingdom Assets in the Service of MEGA: Sea, Flows, Space, Continuity

European security is not determined solely on land.
It is shaped along maritime routes, ports, straits, undersea cables, logistics.It is also shaped in space: satellites, communications, navigation, observation, early warning.And we already have a major asset:
European space — the ESA and our shared capabilities — in the service of our sovereignty.
Within this framework, the United Kingdom enters MEGA as a pillar.We place at the service of this project:

Because a continent can be paralysed without invasion if it is cut off from the world,
and because a stable world is not a closed one:
it is a world in which trade is possible without extortion.

[FR] — Against the Return of Nation-States as Trading Posts

I want to add an essential warning.
We do not want to see the return of nation-states as trading posts.
A trading-post state is not merely a private territory.
It is a world in which sovereignty is fragmented into enclaves, in which citizenship becomes a subscription,
and in which the law dissolves into terms of service.And yet, we already see this temptation at work.
When private actors claim to organise security, digital identity, currency,
the public space of expression, even entire territories,
outside of any democratic control.When access to the public space depends on a platform,
when a rule can be modified unilaterally,
when an account can be suspended without effective recourse,
then it is no longer merely a service:
it is a sovereign function that has been privatised.This future is not progress.
It is a regression disguised as modernity.
A return to a logic of extraction,
in which a few emancipate themselves from the common rule
while the greatest number remains exposed.MEGA is also a response to this:
we affirm that innovation must serve democracy —never replace it.
And that popular sovereignty will not be replaced
by the sovereignty of capital.

[DE] — Pluralism of Ideas, Unity of Principles

I want to avoid a misunderstanding.
MEGA is not a project of single-minded thinking. A democracy does not require unanimity of opinions.
It requires agreement on a few foundations:

Within this framework, pluralism is not a problem: it is a strength.

[UK] — Freedom Exists Within a Framework: Magna Carta, Enlightenment, Responsibility

Our European heritage carries a constant: freedom is limited power.In the United Kingdom, this idea has a founding symbol: the Magna Carta.
It reminds us that no authority stands above the law,
and that power must be held to account.This requirement then runs through the whole of European thought. With the Enlightenment, it becomes a complete architecture:
public reason, debate, the common law.And Montesquieu would formulate it with uncompromising clarity:
the separation of powers,
to prevent capture, arbitrariness, the domination of one alone.From this architecture flows a responsibility:
the responsibility to exercise one’s freedom without destroying that of others, the responsibility of speech in the public space, and the responsibility of power to punish only what is proven,
according to rules that are known, supervised, and independent.For freedom is not impunity. Nor is it arbitrariness.
Freedom is an architecture: it protects citizens as much as it limits the State.

[FR] — Freedom of Expression: Framework, Dignity, Law

Freedom of expression is a condition of democracy.But freedom is not the right to deny the dignity of others.
Incitement to hatred is not an opinion.
Intimidation is not a debate.
The justification of violence through racial, gender-based or origin-based discrimination is not an opinion: it is an offence — sometimes a crime.Democracy protects criticism, satire and opposition.
It does not protect dehumanisation.

[DE] — Antisemitism Is Not an Opinion

As Germans, we say this without equivocation:
antisemitism is not an opinion.
It is hatred.
And hatred is not a debate: it is a weapon.A democracy does not survive if it allows to flourish what seeks to destroy it.

[UK] — Habeas Corpus: Freedom Is Not Chaos

And we add this: our idea of freedom is not a slogan.It comes from a guarantee: habeas corpus.
The principle that a State must justify its actions, answer before a judge, and be limited by the rule.This is what freedom means:
to protect the weak against the arbitrariness of the strong.

[FR] — Shared Truth: Without It, There Is No Democracy

We must state a simple truth: democracy does not rest solely on ballots.
It rests on something more fragile: shared facts.
Without a shared truth, there is no longer a majority:
only tribes.

[UK] — When Truth Is Privatized, Democracy Is Sold

And we must name another danger: the privatization of the public sphere.
When the space of debate depends on private infrastructures, truth can become a product.And when truth becomes a product, democracy becomes negotiable.
We do not want a world in which popular sovereignty dissolves into platforms.

[FR] — Science: A Method of Peace in Disagreement

So how can democracy be protected without sliding into single-minded thinking?Through a very simple idea: method.Truth is not a belief. It is not what suits one side.
It is what resists our preferences.As Étienne Klein puts it, there exists a taste for truth — and it must be cultivated.
But a taste for truth is not enough: discipline is required.
And that discipline is science: not as an ideology, but as a method of doubt, proof, and correction.Science is a method of peace in disagreement.

[DE] — Without Method, Everything Becomes Narrative

Without method, everything becomes narrative.
And when everything becomes narrative, the most violent narrative prevails.A democracy does not fall only when it loses an election.
It falls when it loses reality.

[FR / DE / UK] — Truth, Science, Democracy

Without a shared truth, there is no longer a majority: only tribes.
When truth is privatized, democracy is sold.
Science is not an opinion. It is a method of peace in disagreement.
Without method, everything becomes narrative.
And the most violent narrative prevails.
Without a shared truth, there can be no stable democracy.
Without stable democracy, there can be no common project.
Without a common project, there is no MEGA.

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V — From Words to Action: Timeline and Commitment

[FR] — France: Renouncing the Comfort of Ambiguity (Extended Deterrence)

For this discourse to be credible, it must come at a price.The United Kingdom accepts calling into question a global institutional privilege.
Germany relinquishes the illusion that industry alone is sufficient and commits to placing it at the service of the common good.And France, today, renounces the comfort of ambiguity.We state this clearly:
France is prepared to evolve its posture and to explicitly extend the protection of its deterrence to its European partners who commit themselves to this common political act.This is a grave decision.
It is taken with lucidity.
It is taken for one reason: peace requires ultimate guarantees that are legible and credible.And I add this, without equivocation:
France, too, holds the right of veto on the Security Council.
And we say it with the same level of exigency as that which we uphold here:
what we demand of the world, we apply to ourselves.

[DE] — Power and Limits: What Sets Us Apart

Law needs a shield, and the shield needs law.Our project unites the two: capacity and legitimacy.
Deterrence and rule.
Power and limits.We are building a force to prevent war, not to impose it.

[UK — Free Seas, Secure Flows: Security Is Global

European security is not determined solely on land.It is determined along maritime routes, through straits, ports, cables, and logistics.
We will protect the flows that sustain our economies.Because a continent can be paralysed without invasion — if it is cut off from the world.

[UK] — The World Reads Our Timelines, Not Our Intentions

Our adversaries do not read our intentions. They read our timelines.They do not look at our principles. They look at our ability to translate them into action.In a hard world, slowness becomes a signal.

[FR] — MEGA TIMELINE: 100 Days / 24 Months / 2030

We are announcing a timeline now.Because a doctrine without a timeline is nothing more than a speech.

[DE] — Method Principle: MEGA Core + Circles

MEGA moves forward in circles.
A MEGA Core, formed by willing states, decides quickly on what is essential:
collective security, critical infrastructure, protection of flows.Others may join as soon as they accept the common political contract.
No one is excluded — but no one can block collective survival.Openness, yes.
Paralysis, no.

[UK] — Phase 1: 0–100 Days

In the first one hundred days, we undertake five actions:First, we create the MEGA Core,
and we adopt internal majority decision-making on defence, energy, cyber, and vital infrastructure.Second, we launch the Sovereignty Dividend:
any strategic procurement is conditional on transparency, value sharing, training, and employment.Third, we conduct a public audit of critical dependencies:
payments, cloud and data, semiconductors, munitions, energy.Fourth, we initiate the first coordinated orders for vital capabilities:
ground-based air defence, drones, cybersecurity, infrastructure protection.Fifth, at the United Nations, the United Kingdom and France jointly advance the limitation of the veto for major crimes and acts of aggression, and referral to the General Assembly when the Security Council is paralysed.

[FR] — Phase 2: 6–24 Months

Over the next twenty-four months, we deliver visible results.We launch multi-year procurement programmes:
munitions, air defence, air maintenance, cyber-defence.We organise distributed production and pooled stockpiles, to guarantee endurance over time.We deploy the first operational sovereign infrastructures:
European payment rails for administrations and critical businesses, a strategic cloud, reinforced cybersecurity.We establish a continuity coalition with Canada and Indo-Pacific partners:
maritime security, cable protection, cyber exercises, protection of flows.
And we strengthen democratic oversight:
regular audits, parliamentary scrutiny, anti-capture mechanisms.

[DE] — Phase 3 : 2030 Horizon

By the 2030 horizon, we aim for credible autonomy.The capacity to endure over time,
real industrial sovereignty,
effective cyber and space resilience,
and comprehensive protection of critical infrastructure.An open Europe, but robust:
open through circles of accession,
robust in the face of coercion and blackmail.And a world order upheld by rules that are finally defended,
because a rule without capacity is nothing more than a wish.

[UK] — Neutralisation of Blockages: Not Exclusion, Resilience

I want to say this clearly: neutralising blockages is not an act of authoritarianism.It is the opposite.
It is the protection of peoples.We do not fight illiberal drift by censoring citizens.
We fight it by removing the conditions that allow it to take hold:
social fear, powerlessness, loss of trust.And if a government chooses to violate fundamental rules —
free elections, independent justice, human dignity —
then it will not be excluded:
it will exclude itself.

[FR] — Open Europe: A Political Act

We repeat it:
Europe is not a geography.
Europe is a political act.And that act is open:
to those who want to build,
to those who want to defend the rule of law,
to those who choose a shared future over fragmentation.

[DE] — Final Warning: The Counter-Philosophy of the Enlightenment

We must be lucid:
a counter-philosophy is advancing.It despises equality.
It despises truth.
It treats democracy as a weakness to be corrected.We affirm the opposite:
democracy is our most demanding invention.And it will survive only if we defend it
through social cohesion,
through truth,
and through the rule of law.

[FR / DE / UK] — MEGA in the Face of Imperial Retrenchments

Let us be clear:
MEGA was not born in a vacuum.It is a response to a global movement
that advocates a return to the law of the strongest,
the fragmentation of alliances,
identity retreat,
and the substitution of law by force.This movement takes different names depending on the country.
It sometimes presents itself as a return to greatness.
It promises protection through isolation
and sovereignty through domination.We affirm the opposite.Greatness does not arise from withdrawal,
but from the capacity to cooperate without dissolving.
Sovereignty is not defended by destroying rules,
but by making them enforceable.
And the protection of peoples does not come from fear of the other,
but from the solidity of what is shared.MEGA is a response to these retrenchments.
Not against a country.
Not against a people.
But against a vision of the world
where force replaces law
and where democracy becomes an obstacle to be bypassed.

[UK] — Closing: A Simple Promise

not promise that it will be easy.
We promise that it will be done.Because the future does not wait for unanimity.
And because history does not forgive impotence.

[FR] — Conclusion: Returning to Saint-Exupéry

We end where we began.
We do not inherit the Earth.
We borrow it from our children.So we do what our time demands:
we stop being naïve, without becoming cynical.
We become capable.MEGA.
Make Europe Great Again.
Make Earth Great Again.

[DE] — Conclusion: Power Under Control

The force we are building is not an imperialism.
It is a discipline of survival.Limited power.
Protected law.
Non-negotiable dignity.Make Europe Great Again.
Make Earth Great Again.

[UK] — Conclusion: Free Seas, a Livable World

A livable world is a world
where flows remain free,
where rules hold,
where truth is not for sale.Make Europe Great Again.
Make Earth Great Again.We thank you.

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Analyses

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Hormuz: The Question Europe Dares Not Ask

10 March 2026

In a recent op-ed devoted to the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, I raised a simple question: can control of a strategic maritime passage become a global economic weapon?Recent developments now invite an even more troubling question. The possible closure of the strait and the progressive militarisation of its security are already producing tangible effects: slowing oil flows, soaring maritime insurance premiums and a surge in global oil prices. It is not even necessary for global trade to be interrupted for the economic impact to be significant. In a market largely driven by risk anticipation, the mere prospect of a prolonged disruption of a chokepoint such as Hormuz is enough to push the price of oil sharply upward.Energy tension is thus becoming an explicit instrument of strategic pressure. Iranian officials have warned that continued escalation could drive oil prices to 200 dollars per barrel. Asked about rising prices, Donald Trump himself downplayed the increase, stating that higher oil prices would represent “a very small price to pay for the protection of the United States and the world,” adding that “only fools would think otherwise.” Under these conditions, rising energy prices no longer appear merely as a collateral effect of the crisis, but as a strategic variable consciously integrated into the ongoing confrontation.Yet this situation does not affect all powers in the same way. Major importing economies — foremost among them Europe — directly bear the rising cost of energy and maritime transport. By contrast, several producing powers now possess a far greater capacity to absorb the shock of high oil prices. The United States has become one of the world’s leading producers thanks to shale oil, while Russia continues to derive a substantial share of its public revenues from energy exports. In this context, a persistently high oil price does not represent an equivalent strategic constraint for all actors.In this environment, the reaction of the Gulf states also deserves attention. Several of them have publicly expressed concern about what they perceive as insufficient protection of energy routes by the United States, historically the guarantor of maritime security in the region. This criticism is not trivial. It suggests that the actors most directly exposed to a potential closure of the strait do not believe that American power is currently seeking to restore maximum security as rapidly as possible.This asymmetry becomes even more striking when combined with recent political statements that tend to minimise its implications. Rising oil prices have been downplayed by American officials, while the impact of a high oil price on the Russian economy has sometimes been explicitly minimised. At the same time, the possibility of easing energy sanctions targeting Moscow is now being discussed, while some European leaders continue to advocate their removal.Taken individually, each of these elements might be explained by circumstances specific to the current crisis. Yet their combination — sustained tension around the Strait of Hormuz, structurally higher oil prices, criticism from Gulf states regarding insufficient American maritime protection, debates about easing sanctions on Russian energy exports, political minimisation of the impact of high oil prices on the Russian economy, and persistent divisions within the European Union on energy policy — now forms a pattern of signals whose coherence deserves closer examination.A further question also arises on the military level. Effective control of a strait such as Hormuz would in principle require the capacity to prevent asymmetric attacks originating from the coastline — fast attack craft, drones, naval drones or coastal missiles. In practice, this implies the ability to control the coastal areas from which such threats might be launched.Several military analysts have recently pointed out the apparent absence, in the deployments discussed, of amphibious forces or ground troops capable of ensuring such coastal control. François Chauvancy, a former French brigadier general, has publicly expressed his puzzlement at a configuration that does not correspond to the usual patterns of American strategic planning.This observation is all the more striking given that the scenario of a blockade of the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz has been studied in military planning for more than half a century, particularly since the Iranian revolution of 1979. It is therefore not an unforeseen threat but a classic scenario of strategic planning in the region. Under these circumstances, the hypothesis of simple unpreparedness appears difficult to reconcile with the long tradition of American military planning in this theatre. The absence of certain elements normally associated with the full control of a strategic strait inevitably raises questions about the actual objectives being pursued.The convergence of these signals produces a more troubling configuration. The energy tensions generated by the Hormuz crisis could create economic effects simultaneously favourable to the two main producing powers involved in global strategic rivalry — the United States and Russia — while the heaviest costs would be borne by major importing economies, foremost among them Europe.This material convergence does not occur in a political vacuum. Some American proposals for resolving the Ukrainian conflict now strikingly reproduce several demands formulated by the Kremlin since the beginning of the war: recognition of territorial gains obtained by force, the long-term neutrality of Ukraine, and limitations on its military capabilities. Several analyses have pointed out that the very structure of these proposals closely reflects Russian positions expressed during previous negotiations, to the point that certain formulations appear almost directly inspired by Russian diplomatic rhetoric.Should such a framework prevail, it would effectively legitimise the results of an armed aggression — including in areas that Russia has not fully conquered militarily — and would constitute a major rupture with the principles that have structured the international order since 1945.This is not to assert the existence of a coordinated plan between Washington and Moscow. But the history of international relations reminds us of a frequently forgotten reality: alliances are never immutable. From Bismarck’s diplomacy to the German-Soviet pact of 1939, shifts in alignment occur whenever changes in material interests make unexpected rapprochements between rival powers possible. In this sense, the Hormuz crisis may function as a revealing moment.In this context, the effort undertaken by France to secure maritime circulation and protect European interests deserves recognition, alongside the more limited contributions made by other European countries. It reflects a genuine willingness to act at a time when the traditional mechanisms of collective security appear increasingly fragile.Yet this commitment also reveals a more uncomfortable reality. Faced with a strategic crisis of this magnitude, Europe remains largely dependent on the initiative of a single state. The question therefore becomes unavoidable: should France bear alone the defence of European interests in an increasingly unstable strategic environment? And more importantly, does it truly possess the means to do so?The long-term security of a global energy chokepoint exceeds the capabilities of any single state. If Europe truly wishes to protect its supplies, stabilise its trade routes and exert influence in international crises, it will sooner or later need to possess the full attributes of power — diplomatic, economic and military — necessary to defend its own interests.Placing this burden permanently on a single country would in any case be both unfair and ineffective. One cannot expect a state to assume a disproportionate share of the continent’s strategic security while simultaneously reproaching it for the budgetary weight of such a commitment.In a world where the security of energy routes depends on the military power of a few states, the effective control of a strategic maritime passage can become a lever of global economic influence. If this were the case, the question raised by the Hormuz crisis would regain its full significance: can the control of an energy chokepoint become a global economic weapon — and could it, for the first time since 1945, begin to fracture the system of alliances that structures the international order?

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Putin and Trump: Founding Fathers of a European Power?

6 March 2026

For a long time, Europe believed it could live in a world stabilized by international law, alliances, and economic interdependence. This vision rested on a simple assumption: high-intensity war had disappeared from the European continent, and collective security mechanisms would suffice to contain crises.This assumption is now being put to the test. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought war back to the heart of the continent. At the same time, the repercussions of the war launched against Iran by Israel and the United States in the Strait of Hormuz serve as a stark reminder of how quickly global energy routes can become instruments of power. This war also reveals a political divergence within Europe. Several states have expressed varying degrees of opposition to the military operation. The President of the Spanish Government, Pedro Sánchez, did so explicitly by refusing any Spanish participation in the conflict. France has adopted a critical position: President Emmanuel Macron has questioned the legal legitimacy of the operation and denounced the lack of consultation with European partners. By contrast, other European governments, particularly in Germany and the United Kingdom, remain politically aligned with Washington while calling for the avoidance of regional escalation. This divergence reveals a deeper problem. The economic pressures exerted by the United States against Spain in response to its refusal to participate in the conflict directly raise the question of European solidarity. If a Member State is subjected to external coercion for a sovereign political decision, the European Union is, in principle, bound to mitigate its effects. The paradox thus becomes clear: some European governments may find themselves politically supporting the American position while being legally obliged to offset the consequences of pressure exerted against one of their own partners.In this context, a strategic question emerges with particular acuity: can Europe be drawn into a war it neither decided nor desired? The alliance mechanisms that structure European security make this hypothesis plausible. A regional escalation could lead to strikes against bases or territories linked to NATO, potentially triggering collective defense mechanisms. However, Europe’s strategic architecture extends beyond the Atlantic Alliance. Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a mutual assistance obligation between Member States in the event of armed aggression. To these multilateral mechanisms must be added numerous bilateral defense agreements and the direct military presence of several European states in the Middle East. France, in particular, is bound by defense agreements with several Gulf monarchies and maintains permanent military facilities in the region, notably in the United Arab Emirates. In a context of regional escalation, these commitments may create direct military obligations independently of the activation of NATO’s Article 5. In concrete terms, the war against Iran is already leading to European military mobilization. The French carrier strike group is currently operating in the eastern Mediterranean, while France’s air presence in the Gulf has been reinforced by the deployment of six additional Rafale fighter jets, bringing the total to twelve. Officially, this posture is defensive: it aims to protect French installations, regional partners, and European nationals. However, the mere presence of forces inherently creates a risk of escalation. In contemporary doctrines of force employment, defense does not consist solely in intercepting an attack; it often involves neutralizing its source. In other words, one does not merely shoot down the arrow; one seeks to destroy the archer — according to the U.S. Navy’s doctrinal formula “shoot the archer, not the arrow.” Moreover, the geography of the theatre further reinforces this logic. Air missions launched from the Gulf toward northern Iran would require crossing a large part of Iranian territory both outbound and inbound. By contrast, the eastern Mediterranean offers more direct axes of intervention toward the north-west of the country. The mere disposition of forces can thus transform a protective posture into an escalatory capability. The risk of entanglement therefore stems less from a single institutional mechanism than from the interweaving of multiple alliance systems: multilateral alliances, bilateral treaties, and permanent military presence.Europe thus finds itself confronted with a paradoxical situation: it may be drawn into a war it neither initiated nor desired, while remaining exposed to the economic and strategic consequences of a conflict decided elsewhere. Consequently, the more external pressures seek to divide Europe or prevent the emergence of an autonomous European power, the more they reveal the necessity of such a transformation. This is where the historical paradox lies. Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine have already contributed to reviving the question of European military power. In this context, the French proposal to extend the scope of its nuclear deterrence to its European partners may constitute the first concrete outline of a continental strategic pillar. Moreover, the positions adopted by Donald Trump toward Europe could produce a comparable effect at both the political and strategic levels. Far from slowing the emergence of European power, such pressures may in fact accelerate its necessity. History offers numerous examples of political entities that were forged under strategic constraint rather than by initial choice: the United States itself became a federation when it realized that an overly weak confederation could not survive in a conflictual international environment. Europe may now be facing a similar question: in a world that has once again become conflictual, can an economic power sustainably delegate its strategic security to external actors? If the answer is no, a deeper transformation may already be underway: the gradual emergence of a European Leviathan — that is, a political power capable of collectively assuming the essential functions of strategic sovereignty. History may then record an unexpected paradox: those who most sought to prevent the emergence of European power may ultimately have been its true catalysts. Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump would thus appear, despite themselves, as those who helped awaken this European Leviathan.Jean-Philippe Battédou

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Can we allow extremists to come to power?

5 March 2026

French political life is now structured around a marked imbalance between radical poles and governing forces. According to trends compiled by PolitPro, parties located at the extremes alone account for nearly 60% of voting intentions: the Rassemblement National reaching around 35%, while the radical left organized around La France insoumise and its allies stands at approximately 24%. The rest of the political landscape appears significantly more fragmented: around 40% of the electorate is divided between the central bloc stemming from the presidential majority (around 14%), the parliamentary right represented by Les Républicains (approximately 12%), and other left-wing forces — socialists, ecologists and related movements — which together account for about 16% of voting intentions. Traditional governing forces are thus relegated to a minority and dispersed position within the political system.This distribution means that no single bloc holds a stable majority. In a two-round majority system, access to the second round depends more on relative ranking than on obtaining an absolute majority in the first round, and in a fragmented landscape, a threshold of around 20 to 22% of the vote may be sufficient to qualify a candidate. The combination of these two elements thus mechanically favors parties with a consolidated electoral base in this arithmetic range over more dispersed competitors.As a result, electoral competition is no longer limited to the ordinary alternation between competing programmes: it increasingly concerns the definition of the people, the scope of rights, and the hierarchy of sovereignties. When rivalry touches upon these substantive elements, electoral defeat may be experienced as a profound challenge rather than a temporary alternation. In such a configuration, two outcomes become theoretically conceivable: either a dynamic of political conflict likely to degenerate into civil war, or, conversely, a hardening of power leading to an illiberal drift of the regime. It is therefore necessary to examine these two scenarios in turn.In the first case, while France is not in a state of civil war, political violence is nonetheless present: antagonistic activist groups exist and have been involved in clashes in recent years — far-left groups, including certain antifascist organizations such as La Jeune Garde, on one side, and far-right groups such as the GUD on the other. Thus, in 2013, Clément Méric, an antifascist activist, was killed during a fight in Paris involving militants from the far-right skinhead movement linked to Troisième Voie and the Jeunesses nationalistes révolutionnaires, while Quentin Deranque died in Lyon in 2026 following a confrontation involving ultra-left militants associated with the group La Jeune Garde, among whom was Jacques-Élie Favrot, parliamentary assistant to La France insoumise MP Raphaël Arnault, charged with complicity in voluntary homicide. These events stem from militant clashes, but they also reveal porous boundaries between militant radicalism and political spheres, feeding a level of conflict that goes beyond mere verbal confrontation.In this regard, on January 6, 2021, a crowd of militants stormed the Capitol in Washington in an attempt to prevent the certification of the U.S. presidential election, in what has been widely analysed as an attempted coup. The failure of this effort owed as much to the intervention of security forces as to the decision of certain institutional actors to uphold the constitutional process, reminding us that democratic stability also depends on the concrete behaviour of political and institutional actors. Even if these elements are not sufficient to characterize an insurrectional situation in France, they demonstrate that the possibility of violent political confrontation is no longer purely abstract.In the second scenario, recent history shows that the destabilization of a regime does not necessarily occur through open violence. Several contemporary trajectories — in Hungary under Viktor Orbán, in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or in Russia — have followed a different sequence: electoral victory, legal institutional reforms, gradual weakening of checks and balances, and a reduction in political reversibility. Elections persist, but the conditions of competition become asymmetrical. These situations are not identical; nevertheless, they share a common logic of cumulative adjustments rather than abrupt rupture.In France, certain public discourses explicitly place popular sovereignty in tension with institutional checks and balances. On one side of the political spectrum, Marine Le Pen advocates an expanded use of referendums, presented as a direct expression of the will of the people against institutions deemed distant; on the other, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, following the judicial conviction of Marine Le Pen in 2025, has argued that the removal of an elected official should be decided by the people rather than by judges. While these positions differ in their motivations, they share a common effect: shifting the centre of legitimacy toward direct majority expression. The referendum is not in itself illiberal; however, when used against minority protections or judicial independence, it alters the institutional balance, making the issue less about the instrument itself than about its use.This is where the specific architecture of the Fifth Republic comes into play: by concentrating executive authority in a president elected by direct universal suffrage and relying on majority rule, it transforms a presidential victory into rapid legislative capacity, a phenomenon further reinforced since 2000 by the alignment of presidential and legislative calendars following the transition from a seven-year to a five-year term. Consequently, while Parliament holds a central place in the institutions, the alignment of the parliamentary majority with the executive significantly limits its ability to function as an effective counter-power. As a result, an executive backed by a disciplined majority can modify ordinary electoral rules, redefine the status of independent administrative authorities, or adjust the balance between security and liberties through legislation. It is therefore not necessary to violate the Constitution to substantially alter its equilibrium, since such transformations can occur within formal legality. In this respect, comparison with post-1949 Germany is instructive: the Grundgesetz, the German Basic Law, was designed as a “militant democracy,” equipped with an eternity clause protecting certain principles, a Federal Constitutional Court, the possibility of banning parties hostile to the constitutional order, and a federal fragmentation of power. By contrast, the French Fifth Republic was designed to stabilize the executive and avoid parliamentary paralysis, not explicitly to prevent majority capture.Thus, the scenario of an illiberal shift does not require prior intent nor a dramatic rupture. It corresponds to a structural possibility: that of a gradual transformation of the rules of the game by a majority convinced of the need to secure its victory.
Ultimately, the danger lies not in a catastrophic prophecy, but in the combination of substantive polarization and a concentrated institutional architecture.
Democratic resilience depends less on declared intentions than on the ability of institutions to withstand a majority determined to test their limits.Can such a concentrated majoritarian system remain suited to a society that is now tripolar and durably polarized?Jean-Philippe Battédou

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